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The analysis of legal doctrine in terms of its contribution to economic
efficiency originated in antitrust law.1 Since then, a succession of scholars
has extended this form of analysis across the legal board, from tort law to
corporate law, from crimes to the Constitution.2 Now, a rising chorus is
urging that the enterprise be brought full circle: In effect, these authors
argue not only that economic efficiency criteria should govern antitrust,
but that antitrust in turn should govern all other legislation-at least in
the nonfederal sphere.
The vehicle for accomplishing this result is a revision of antitrust's state
action doctrine. That doctrine currently immunizes the regulatory policies
of states from attack under the Sherman Act. According to the revisionists,
the courts should substantially narrow the scope of state action immunity
to permit the preemption of a greater number of economically inefficient
state regulations.'
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1. See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic
Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regu-
lation, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1956).
2. See, e.g., G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Easterbrook, Foreword: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Foreword];
Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967); ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICR OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (G. Becker & W. Landes eds. 1974). See generally R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
3. The term "revisionists" is used here as a general label for advocates of a wide variety of pro-
posals to revise the state action doctrine. Their views are described in such recent works as Cirace, An
Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REV. 481, 484, 486,
498, 514-15 (1982); Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 51-54; Werden & Balmer, Conflicts
Between State Law and the Sherman Act, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 58-72 (1982); and Wiley, A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1986). For earlier versions of the
revisionist approach, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-13 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ANTI-
tRusT L.J. 950 (1970); Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs and Raisins: An Analysis of the State
Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 31, 32-33, 72-75 (1979); Posner, The
Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
693, 707, 714 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v.
Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 74, 105, 109 (1974).
Although Judge Easterbrook shares elements of the revipionist position, particularly its description
of the assumptions that underlie the Court's current approach to state action, his prescription for
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The revisionist analysis has both descriptive and prescriptive elements.
Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court's state action cases already
evidence an underlying trend toward greater judicial intrusion into state
regulatory policies-a trend which reflects an increasing skepticism to-
ward the economic value of regulation and, more specifically, an increas-
ing suspicion that regulation serves only the special interests of those who
lobby for it.4 In addition, many find such a trend praiseworthy, suggesting
only that judicial intervention be enhanced so as to ensure economic effi-
ciency even more efficiently. 5 An improved state action doctrine, they con-
tend, will better accomplish what is assertedly its only legitimate function:
permitting the preemption of state regulation imposing an unwarranted
restraint on market competition.6
This Article argues that the revisionist analysis is wrong on both its
descriptive and prescriptive levels. First, the state action cases do not ex-
hibit an inexorable trend toward greater federal intrusion, and have little
to do either with notions of economic efficiency or with suspicions that
regulatory programs have been captured by special interests. To the con-
trary, the cases, including the most recent ones involving "municipal" ac-
tion, reflect an increasing deference toward state regulation. This defer-
ence represents the judiciary's effort to respect the results of the political
process, tempered only by the compromises needed to accommodate re-
spect for that process at both the state and federal levels. As discussed
below, the Supreme Court has sought such an accommodation by apply-
ing the state action doctrine to oust those state regulations-but only those
state regulations-that seek to delegate to private parties the power to
restrain market competition.
Second, this Article argues that the Court's effort is fundamentally cor-
rect. The judiciary should not interfere under the aegis of the antitrust
change would limit the preemption of inefficient state regulations to those which export overcharges
beyond the bounds of the regulating state. See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 51 n.120;
Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 23, 27-28, 45-50 (1983)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism]. In addition, although as discussed in the text the
practical effect of Professor Wiley's proposed revision of the state action doctrine is to narrow it
substantially, there are circumstances under which his proposal theoretically could immunize state
action not protected under current law. See infra note 181. Finally, it should be noted that others who
have applied economic analysis to the state action doctrine have reached conclusions quite opposite
those of the revisionists, arguing for greater rather than lesser deference to local regulation. See, e.g.,
Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23, 25-26 (1984).
4. See Cirace, supra note 3, at 484, 486, 514-15; Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 51-54;
Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism, supra note 3, at 27; Wiley, supra note 3, at 714-15, 718-19,
723-27, 789.
5. See Cirace, supra note 3, at 486, 498, 514-15; Werden & Balmer, supra note 3, at 58-72;
Wiley, supra note 3, at 743-44, 748-56, 772-73; see also Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Donnem, supra note 3, at 966-67; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 73; Posner, supra note 3,
at 707, 714; Slater, supra note 3, at 74, 105, 109.
6. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 788.
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laws with a state's political decision, however misguided it may be, to
substitute regulation for the operation of the market. Despite protesta-
tions, the revisionist proposal is little more than a return to the era the
Court left behind when it repudiated Lochner v. New York.7 The substi-
tution of "antitrust" for "due process" and "economic efficiency" for "lib-
erty of contract" does not make the assault on democratic politics any
more palatable.
I. THE COURT'S CURRENT APPROACH TO STATE ACTION
State action immunity was born in the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown,8
in which the Supreme Court held that Congress had not intended the
Sherman Act to bar states from imposing restraints on competition. The
Court largely9 ignored the issue for the next thirty years until, in the mid-
1970's, it began struggling over the appropriate test for determining
whether a restraint in fact constitutes "state action." Various opinions
suggested that Parker immunity did not apply unless (1) private parties
acting under the restraint had been compelled to do so by the state;10 (2)
the state itself had been named as a defendant;"1 or' (3) immunity was
"necessary" in order to make the state's regulatory program work.' 3 By
the time of its 1980 opinion in California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,' 4 however, a unanimous Court had set-
tled upon a different, two-pronged test for state action immunity: To re-
ceive immunity, the challenged restraint had to be (1) "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy," and (2) "actively supervised"
by the state itself.1 5 With certain exceptions for restraints imposed by mu-
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner and subsequent cases, state economic regulation was over-
turned under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court repudiated this "sub-
stantive due process" approach in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See infra text accompanying notes 142-49.
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker upheld the validity of a California program regulating the mar-
keting of the state's raisin crop.
9. But see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 122-25).
10. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579, 592-94 & n.28 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
11. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 361; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 591-92, 601 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
12. The Court's opinions did not make clear the degree to which the various tests had indepen-
dent significance.
13. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 361; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 597-98. Individual Justices suggested further
requirements, including (1) that the restraint not involve a municipality's "proprietary" enterprises,
see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 418 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); and (2) that the restraint satisfy a "rule of reason" under which its benefits outweigh its
potential harms, see Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
14. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
15. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. This test was anticipated in I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTrRUST LAW 212c (1978), and in several earlier opinions. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin
W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-10 (1978); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (opinion of Brennan, J.);
Vol. 96: 486, 1987
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nicipalities, ' the two-pronged Midcal test continued to hold sway through
the 1984-85 Term.1 7 Although the Court's recent opinion in Fisher v.
City of Berkeley18 once again casts matters into doubt, one can, as dis-
cussed below, read the new test propounded in Fisher as merely restating
Midcal's basic tenets. 9
Numerous other commentators have traced the development of the state
action doctrine and have described its workings in detail. ° The question
considered here is what Parker's progeny reflect about the Court's views
on the appropriate relation between the federal judiciary and state regula-
tion. This Part considers two quite different conclusions regarding that
question.
A. State Action Immunity as Skepticism About Capture
1. The Theory
According to the revisionists, Parker v. Brown represents a naive, now-
discredited confidence in the value of regulation. A child of the New Deal,
Parker assertedly saw regulation both as an economically necessary effort
to correct market defects, and as a politically legitimate effort to serve the
public interest. It was this public interest vision that drove the Court to
defer to state regulation and declare it off-limits to antitrust challenge.21
Since those days, the revisionists argue, that public interest conception
has eroded deeply. 2 An increasing economic sophistication has unmasked
the inefficiency of regulation and its failure to correlate with, much less
correct, market failure. Perhaps more important, this shift in the intellec-
tual environment has brought increased suspicion that regulation serves
not the public interest, but rather the private interests of groups that ei-
ther have "captured" regulatory bodies, or have controlled them from the
start through their successful efforts to lobby the legislature. Regulation is
Bates, 433 U.S. at 362.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63, 89-96.
17. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985); Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39-40 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569
(1984); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 & n.14 (1982).
18. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 64-71, 97-135.
20. See, e.g., I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, i 207-17; Jorde, Antitrust and the
New "State Action" Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
(forthcoming); authorities cited supra note 3.
21. See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 52-53; Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism,
supra note 3, at 27; Werden & Balmer, supra note 3, at 69-70; Wiley, supra note 3, at 714-15,
718-19. See generally S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 10 (1982) (describing public inter-
est theory); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL. J. EcoN. & MGMrr. Sc. 335, 336
(1974) (same).
22. See Easterbrook, Foreword, suprpi note 2, at 52-54; Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism,
supra note 3, at 23-24; Wiley, supra note 3, at 714-15, 723-26.
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seen not as a bona fide effort to correct market defects, but as a conscious
attempt to create such defects in order to favor politically adept special
interests. 23 There are numerous versions of this interest group theory,
some crude and some sophisticated, some espoused by the Left and some
by the Right, some formulated by economists and some by lawyers or
political scientists.24 In his recent article, Professor John Wiley uses the
shorthand "capture theory" to capture their essence.25
This interest group or capture theory has finally replaced the old New
Deal model in the eyes of the Court, argue Professor Wiley, Judge Frank
Easterbrook, and others. And it is this skepticism about the value of regu-
lation, and this suspicion of regulation's true motives, that are now assert-
edly driving the post-Parker state action cases. 26 Parker's deference to-
ward state regulation purportedly has been replaced by an increasing
willingness to subject state regulatory policies to federal antitrust scrutiny,
a willingness which has led the Court to reject state action defenses in
numerous cases since Parker v. Brown. Moreover, as deregulation contin-
ues to replace regulation on the national political agenda, we are told that
we may expect these judicial intrusions into anticompetitive state pro-
grams to accelerate . 7
2. The Theory's Defects
As an empirical description of the Supreme Court's state action cases,
the capture theory could not be more wrong. To begin with, there is little
if anything in the language of the opinions that suggests the Court was
reacting to a capture conception of regulation.28 Indeed, in those few cases
23. See authorities cited supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AND THE ICC (1970); G. KoLKo, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); R. POSNER, supra note
2, at 405-07; Green & Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man,
82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 3
(1971). See generally S. BREYER, supra note 21, at 9-10 (describing capture and interest group
theories); Posner, supra note 21, at 341-43 (same); Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminis-
trative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-85, 1687 (1975) (same).
25. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 723-28.
26. See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 18-19, 42, 51-54; Easterbrook, Antitrust and
Federalism, supra note 3, at 27; Wiley, supra note 3, at 714-15, 723, 727-28, 789; see also Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 379 n.3 (7th Cir. 1983) (Wisdom, J.), affd, 471 U.S. 34
(1985); H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 n.4 (1984); M. HANDLER, REFORMING THE
ANrrmRusT LAWS 59-60 (1982).
27. See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 18-19, 51-54; Wiley, supra note 3, at 714,
719-23, 726-28.
28. Accord Wiley, supra note 3, at 723, 727-28. Professor Wiley concedes that the only language
evincing a concern with capture is the citation by two Justices to law review articles that Wiley
regards as "capture literature," in cases in which the Court nonetheless upheld state action defenses.
See id. at 727 n.66 (noting Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 377 n.34 (1977)). Judge Easterbrook notes the same citations. See
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in which the Court did note that the challenged legislation had been lob-
bied for by private interests, it upheld rather than rejected the state action
defense.
In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 9 for example, the
Court upheld perhaps the most "captured" scheme ever to come before it:
a California regulation permitting established automobile dealers to delay
substantially the establishment of competing franchises in their geographic
markets. Despite Justice Stevens' dissenting view that the regulation rep-
resented nothing more than the success of the car dealers in lobbying the
state legislature for a special anticompetitive benefit,30 the Court held that
the state action exemption put the regulation beyond the reach of the anti-
trust laws.3 Just one Term before, and over a similar dissent, the Court
had upheld a Maryland statute barring oil company ownership of service
stations-despite ample evidence that the statute was the successful prod-
uct of a lobbying campaign by retail gasoline dealers.3 2
Lacking internal indicia that the Justices have been motivated by con-
cern over anticompetitive capture, the revisionists must fall back on what
they perceive as parallels in timing between increasing intellectual skepti-
cism toward regulation and the Court's increasingly intrusive state action
Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 16 n.16. Professor Wiley also points to judicial references to
the "anticompetitive" nature of the restraints under attack in other cases. Such references are to be
expected, however, because if restraints are not at least assumed to be anticompetitive, consideration of
a state action defense would be both unnecessary and irrelevant.
29. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
30. See 439 U.S. at 115, 120.
31. 439 U.S. at 109.
32. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 129-34 (1978); see id. at 140 n.7, 141 & n.8,
143 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting in part); see also New Motor Vehicle Bd., 439 U.S.
at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nor are these two the only illustrations of "captured" regulations
nonetheless upheld by the Court. Both Professor Wiley and Judge Easterbrook, for example, regard
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), which immunized Arizona lawyers' alleged use of state law
to restrict competitive entry into the legal profession, as a case of interest group capture. See Wiley,
supra note 3, at 739 n.131; Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 53. The Court, however, held
that permitting "Sherman Act plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state sovereigns and base their
claims on perceived conspiracies to restrain trade among [those who] . . . advise the sovereign...
would emasculate the Parker v. Brown Ooctrine." 466 U.S. at 580.
Of course, there are examples of cases involving what could be viewed as "captured" restraints
where the Court has refused to validate state action defenses. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975) (overturning minimum-fee schedules enforced by state bar); Wiley, supra note 3,
at 769. But since almost any regulation subject to antitrust challenge can be characterized as serving
one special interest or another, see infra text accompanying note 180, such evidence is of little weight.
Similarly, there certainly are examples of cases involving economically inefficient state regulations
where the Court has declined to find state action. Had the Court been motivated solely by a distaste
for economic inefficiency, however, virtually every state action defense to come before it would have
been rejected-rather than just the handful that were. See, e.g., S. BREVER, supra note 21, at 225
(criticizing trucking regulation like that later upheld in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)); E. MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcS 73-74 (4th
ed. 1983) (criticizing rent control ordinance like that at issue in Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct.
1045 (1986)); R. Rogers, The Effect of State Entry Regulation on Retail Automobile Markets (FTC
Staff Report, Jan. 1986) (criticizing state regulation like that upheld in New Motor Vehicle Bd.).
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decisions."3 Such an approach might well be subject to attack as post hoc
reasoning-except that the asserted trend simply is not there.
It is true that the Court rejected state action defenses in a number of
post-Parker cases.3" It is also true that during the mid-1970's the Court
toyed with a number of state action tests, such as the requirement that the
restraint be compelled and not simply approved by the state, that would
have significantly narrowed the doctrine and permitted substantial judicial
intrusion into state regulatory policies.35 But despite the blossoming in the
1980's of a bipartisan, national consensus favoring economic deregula-
tion,36 the recent trend in the state action cases has been one of greater
judicial deference toward state regulatory policies. Since mid-1982, while
deregulation has triumphed in Congress," the Court has upheld against
antitrust attack all five state or local regulatory schemes that have come
before it."8 Indeed, in the Terms following Judge Easterbrook's pro-
nouncement that the Justices had finally gotten the hang of economic
33. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 728.
34. The Court rejected a state action defense in six cases decided after Parker. See Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Pro-
fessor Wiley finds two additional rejections by counting Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983), which affirmed without Court opinion Judge Green's hundred-page opinion in the AT&T
divestiture case, of which only two pages dealt with state action, see United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131, 157-58 (D.D.C. 1982); and by counting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1974), which
held that professional baseball was exempt from federal antitrust law and that the commerce clause
precluded the application of state antitrust laws, all without any mention of Parker v. Brown. See
Wiley, supra note 3, at 719-22.
On the other hand, depending upon how one counts, the Court has upheld state action from anti-
trust attack in equal or greater numbers. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986);
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see also Rice v.
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982) (preemption analysis); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md.,
437 U.S. 117 (1978) (same); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966) (same).
In its most recent opinion, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986), the
Court upheld the FTC's determination that the Federation violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act by forbidding its members to submit x-rays to dental insurers for use in claim determina-
tions. In so doing, the Court rejected the Federation's assertion that its action was "immunized from
antitrust scrutiny by virtue of a supposed policy of the State of Indiana against the evaluation of
dental x rays by lay employees of insurance companies." Id. at 2021. The Court noted the FTC's
finding that there was no such state policy, and further noted that even if there were, there was no
suggestion that the state had supervised the Federation's boycott as a method of enforcing such a
policy. Id.
35. See supra note 13 and text accompanying notes 10-13 (describing five such tests).
36. See Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 507, 507-08 (1985).
37. See id. at 508.
38. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf.
v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985);
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982). FTC
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986), did not involve a challenge to a state's
regulatory policy. See supra note 34.
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analysis, 9 the Court issued its three most deferential opinions and rejected
the earlier, more intrusive state action tests.
a. The Southern Motor Carriers Case
The first of these cases, Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v.
United States,40 involved a challenge by the Justice Department to the
trucking regulations of four states. The state regulations permitted com-
petitors, operating through "rate bureaus," to agree upon rates for sub-
mission to state public service commissions. Notwithstanding widespread
scholarly opinion that trucking regulation constitutes a classic form of in-
dustry capture and inefficient regulation,41 the Court found the regula-
tions immune from antitrust scrutiny. In so holding, the Court rejected
state action tests suggested in earlier opinions that would have limited the
defense to cases where the state compelled the anticompetitive activity, the
state itself was the defendant, or immunity was necessary to make the
regulatory program work.4 ' The two-pronged Midcal test, Justice Powell
confirmed, alone determined the presence of immunity.43 As long as the
regulation represented clearly articulated state policy, and as long as the
state supervised any private anticompetitive conduct, the regulation would
be free from antitrust review.
Equally important, Southern Motor Carriers may well represent a
softening of the Midcal test itself.44 The Court had previously insisted
that approval by a state agency did not alone constitute sufficient state
authorization to immunize private anticompetitive conduct.45 Yet, al-
though three of the states involved in the Southern Motor Carriers case
had statutes expressly permitting truckers to agree on the rates they sub-
mitted to the states' utility commissions, the Mississippi defense relied on
a statute which simply gave that state's commission the authority to regu-
late rates, buttressed by a commission rule permitting collective ratemak-
39. See Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 4-5, 51, 59.
40. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
41. See, e.g., S. BREVER, supra note 21, at 222-39; R. FELLMETH, supra note 24; Moore, De-
regulating Surface Freight Transportation, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MAR-
KETS 55-98 (A. Phillips ed. 1975); Stigler, supra note 24, at 5-6. Professor Wiley agrees with this
characterization of the state schemes. Wiley, supra note 3, at 739 n.131, 754-56.
42. See 471 U.S. at 56, 57 n.21, 60-61 (rejecting suggested interpretations of Cantor and Gold-
farb cases); see also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
43. See 471 U.S. at 57, 61.
44. Although Professor Wiley acknowledges that Southern Motor Carriers-as well as Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)-may reflect some liberalization of the "clear articu-
lation" requirement, he regards them as offering "but slight relief to states." See Wiley, supra note 3,
at 737-39 & 739 n.130.
45. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585 (1976). Although the Court reiter-
ated this point in Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62-63, the actual outcome of the case-as
noted in the text-suggests a weakening of the Court's earlier position.
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ing. As the Court noted, this raised the question whether the absence of a
statutory provision meant that Mississippi did not have a "clearly articu-
lated" state policy. Nevertheless, the Court found Midcal's first prong4 6
satisfied by the legislature's determination that the commission rather
than the market should set trucking rates. As long as the state has deter-
mined to displace competition with a regulatory regime, the Court held, a
private defendant "need not 'point to a specific, detailed legislative author-
ization' for its challenged conduct." 47
b. The Municipal Action Cases
The Court's retreat from federal intrusion is nowhere as apparent as in
its two recent cases involving restraints imposed by municipalities rather
than states. In two earlier cases, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. 48 and Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,49 the
Court had set the stage for a potentially sweeping invalidation of local
government regulations by holding that cities were not entitled to the same
antitrust immunity as states; like private defendants, cities would have to
satisfy at least the first prong of Midcal 0-proof that a clearly articulated
state policy sanctioned the restraint in question. 51 In Boulder, the Court
held that general "home rule" powers granted the city by the state consti-
tution52 were insufficient to immunize from antitrust challenge Boulder's
regulation of cable television: "A State that allows its municipalities to do
46. The second, "supervision" prong was not at issue in Southern Motor Carriers because the
government had conceded it was satisfied. See 471 U.S. at 62, 66.
47. Id. at 64 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415
(1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
48. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
49. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
50. The Court in Lafayette suggested, although it did not decide, that a municipality would also
have to satisfy Midcal's second prong-proof that the state actively supervised the restraint. See 435
U.S. at 410 (plurality opinion). In Boulder, the Court expressly declined to reach that question. See
455 U.S. at 51-52 n.14.
51. Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413 (plurality opinion).
It is worth noting that the Court rejected immunity in these cases despite the absence of even a
whiff of capture in either of them, a point Professor Wiley concedes for Lafayette but disputes for
Boulder. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 766-67, 769. But if any of the players in Boulder could be said
to have "captured" the city council, it would have to be the plaintiff, the holder of the city's sole cable
permit who, ironically, sought to use the antitrust laws to attack the city's efforts to induce new
entrants into the market. There was no evidence that the private party defendant, one of those poten-
tial entrants, had "captured" the city council; all it had done was write the council requesting a
permit to provide competing service, see 455 U.S. at 44-45, surely an act protected by the First
Amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 161-81; see also 455 U.S. at 47 n.9 (noting trial court
finding that evidence was insufficient to establish conspiracy between city and defendant permit
seeker).
52. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 ("It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the
people of all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local
and municipal matters.").
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as they please can hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific an-
ticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought.""3
The Boulder decision was met by a flurry of political and academic
criticism stressing its threat to municipal policymaking." Congress swiftly
passed a bill effectively reversing the case as far as treble damage actions
were concerned. 5 And in its next municipal action opinion, Town of Hal-
lie v. City of Eau Claire,"8 the Court made clear that it had gotten the
message.
Under attack in Hallie was the City of Eau Claire's insistence that
unannexed neighboring towns use its sewage collection and transportation
services if they wished to use its sewage treatment facility, the only one in
the area. Although the Court began by proclaiming its allegiance to Boul-
der, it in fact drew back considerably. First, the Court addressed an issue
it had left open in Boulder: whether the second prong of the Midcal test,
the requirement of active supervision by the state, applied to municipal
defendants. The Court held that it did not. "Where the actor is a munici-
pality," Justice Powell said, "there is little or no danger that it is involved
in a private price-fixing arrangement. '57
Second, the Court considered the plaintiffs' contention that Eau Claire's
tie-in was not pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state policy. Although a
53. 455 U.S. at 55.
54. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 965, supra note 26, at 2; Senate Committee Reviews Options for
Legislation in Wake of Boulder, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1162, at 813-14 (Apr.
26, 1984); Local Government Antitrust Liability: The Boulder Decision: Hearings Before the Comm.
on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Civiletti, The Fallout from Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospects for a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379 (1983);
Lopatka, supra note 3, at 23-25; Note, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder The
Emasculation of Municipal Immunity from Sherman Act Liability, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 413 (1983).
See generally Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REv. 435,
439 (1981).
55. See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws (98 Stat.) 2750 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 34-36 (Supp. 11 1984)). The Act states
that "[nlo damages . . may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act . . .from
any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity," 15 U.S.C. § 35
(Supp. 111984), and that no damages may be recovered from a private-party defendant "based on any
official action directed by a local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official
capacity." 15 U.S.C. § 36 (Supp. 11 1984).
The Act provides less immunity than if Congress had simply applied Parker equally to cities, in
that it does not apply to injunctive actions, and in that for private-party defendants it appears to
require municipal compulsion rather than mere approval. See 15 U.S.C. § 36 (Supp. 11 1984) (refer-
ring to "official action directed by [a] local government") (emphasis added). The Act provides more
protection than Parker, however, in that it contains no requirement of "clear articulation" or "active
supervision" by the city.
56. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
57. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). For municipally regulated private parties to receive immu-
nity, however, active supervision is still required. Id. at 46 n.10. Although Hallie states that active
"state" supervision is required in such cases, id., the word is best read in its generic sense as contem-
plating either state or municipal supervision. It would be extremely unwieldy, for example, for the
Court to require active state-rather than merely municipal-supervision of rents charged by land-
lords under a municipal rent-control ordinance.
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state statute did grant cities authority to construct sewage systems, and to
prescribe the districts to be served, plaintiffs argued that-as in Boul-
der-such authority did not necessarily contemplate that the city would
operate those systems in an anticompetitive manner.58 Although Justice
Powell began his response by insisting that such conduct was indeed a
"foreseeable result" of empowering the city to refuse to serve unannexed
areas,59 that contention was not self-evident. The Boulder Court would
not have considered the mere grant of municipal authority to refuse to
serve certain areas as contemplating the use of such a refusal to enforce an
anticompetitive tie-in.
Nor was the Hallie Court willing to rely on this argument alone. In-
stead, it proceeded to distinguish Boulder on the ground that there the
city possessed "only the most general" grant of local authority from the
state, one which "simply did not address the regulation of cable televi-
sion." 0 That distinction could be read as signaling the Court's willingness
to immunize any municipal regulation as long as the state has authorized
the city to regulate that specific market sector-even if the state has not
necessarily contemplated anticompetitive behavior."' One possible message
was that Boulder's intrusiveness would be limited to cases where the city's
only authorization was in the form of a general home rule provision. The
courts of appeals certainly appear to have read it that way: They have not
rejected a single municipal action defense since the Court issued its opin-
ion in Hallie.12
Whether the Court was now prepared to overrule Boulder, however,
remained an open question. Hallie made that conceivable, since the dis-
58. See 471 U.S. at 41-43.
59. Id. at 42.
60. Id. at 43.
61. Indeed, the Court seemed to go out of its way not to rely solely on a much more express
authorization of the very actions at issue in the case. In a footnote, the Court mentioned-but declined
to regard as decisive-the Wisconsin Supreme Court's conclusion in a related state proceeding that the
legislature had expected the city to undertake the challenged actions. See id. at 44 n.8.
62. See Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Assocs. v. Onslow Memorial Hosp., 795 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.
1986); Mercy-Peninsula Ambulance, Inc., v. County of San Mateo, 791 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1986);
Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org., 790 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1986); Executive Town
& Country Servs. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1986); Falls Chase Special Taxing
Dist. v. City of Tallahassee, 788 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1986); Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince
George's County, 786 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1986); Montauk-Caribbean Airways v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91
(2d Cir. 1986); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of DuPage, 777 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2892 (1986); Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 770 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 886 (1986); L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769
F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1985); Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 769 F.2d
324 (6th Cir. 1985), modified, 774 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1985); Rural Elec. Co. v. Cheyenne Light,
Fuel & Power Co., 762 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1985); Independent Taxicab Drivers' Employees v.
Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 231 (1985);
Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affid, 106 S.
Ct. 2034 (1986).
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tinction it implied between general and sector-specific grants of authority
was without logical significance. After all, there had never been any sug-
gestion that the City of Boulder was acting ultra vires in regulating cable
television under its home rule powers. Boulder plainly had state authority
to regulate;6" the doubt the Boulder Court expressed was whether the
state had contemplated the specific anticompetitive acts in question. Hallie
seemed to render such contemplation unnecessary.
Fisher v. City of Berkeley," an antitrust challenge to Berkeley's rent
control ordinance, presented the Court with an opportunity to reconsider
Boulder, since the ordinance was again largely based on authority derived
from the home rule provisions of a state constitution. 63 Once again, how-
ever, the Court declined to overrule Boulder. In striving to avoid the
Boulder result, however, the Court went so far in the opposite direction
that it risked toppling the entire state action edifice-particularly the
Midcal test-that it had so laboriously constructed during the previous
ten years.
In Fisher, the Court raised a threshold barrier for plaintiffs mounting
antitrust attacks on the facial validity of state or local regulations. When
presented with such a "pre-emption" attack, Justice Marshall wrote,
courts need not even reach the question of state action immunity-nor
Midcal's two-pronged test-unless the regulation were first found to con-
flict "irreconcilably" with the antitrust laws. In making that determina-
tion, he continued, the analysis is the same for both state and municipal
regulation: To be in irreconcilable conflict, the regulation must constitute
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 6
Justice Marshall rejected the contention that Berkeley's rent control or-
dinance did in fact constitute a per se violation of the prohibition on price
fixing contained in section 1 of the Sherman Act. There can be no viola-
tion of section 1, he explained, in the absence of an agreement, and he
refused to find such an agreement either among the landlords, or between
the city and the landlords: "A restraint imposed unilaterally by govern-
ment does not become concerted action within the meaning of the statute
63. See supra note 52.
64. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
65. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 655-56, 693 P.2d 261, 271-72, 209 Cal. Rptr.
682, 692-93 (1984) (citing CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986); see also 106 S.
Ct. at 1056-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that California Supreme Court found authority for
municipal rent control in home rule provisions of state constitution, and arguing that Boulder Court
held similar provisions insufficient for immunity).
66. See 106 S. Ct. at 1048-49, 1051. The Court first suggested this threshold test, with its re-
quirement of a per se violation and its apparent limitation to facial challenges, in Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661, 662 n.9 (1982); see also Boulder, 455 U.S. at 68-69 & n.5
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting similar test).
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simply because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the
law."8 7
As discussed below, Fisher is subject to serious criticism for misappre-
hending the difference between state action immunity and substantive vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.68 In addition, the precise scope of its threshold
test remains unclear. At least for facial attacks on the validity of regula-
tions,69 success appears to require proof of an "agreement"-a word
whose meaning the opinion leaves in doubt, and which may collapse into
nothing more than a restatement of Midcal's supervision requirement.7 0
For purposes of this Section, however, the important point is that Fisher
represents yet a further retreat from judicial scrutiny of both local and
state regulation. Fisher's requirement of an "agreement," applicable in
challenges to both state and municipal action, imposes yet another barrier
to an antitrust plaintiff's success. Notwithstanding the Justices' increasing
economic sophistication and the nation's increasing disillusionment with
economic regulation, 1 the Court has made clear that it has no appetite for
using antitrust law to discipline unreconstructed state or local regulators.
3. The Compromise Explanation
The revisionists are not blind to these empirical difficulties with the
capture theory. To the contrary, they seek to explain the discrepancy be-
tween the Justices' assertedly growing concern for special-interest capture,
and the actual case outcomes, by contending that the cases reflect an ill-
considered compromise between Parker's deference to regulation and the
capture theory's skepticism. It is this compromise that has allegedly led
the Court to the two-pronged Midcal test. 2
67. 106 S. Ct. at 1049-50.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 99-135.
69. The Court appears to intend the preemption test announced in Fisher to govern only efforts to
enjoin the enforcement of a regulation on its face, and not efforts to invalidate regulations for their
effects as applied to individual cases. See 106 S. Ct. at 1051 & n.2. The Court made the same point in
its first formulation of the "preemption" approach to state action questions. See Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 662 & n.8 (1982) (noting that upholding facial validity of statute would
still leave the "manner in which a [defendant] utilizes the . . . statute . . . subject to Sherman Act
analysis.").
What this distinction would mean in particular cases, however, will not always be clear. See infra
notes 116, 117. It was not even clear in Fisher. Justice Marshall noted, for example, that had the
plaintiffs pressed a claim of attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, rather than
claiming a per se violation of § 1, "the inquiry demanded by appellants' allegations [would have gone]
beyond the scope of the facial challenge presented here." 106 S. Ct. at 1051 n.2. Perhaps the inquiry
would be different, but it is difficult to see how the result could be different. It is not possible to
mount an antitrust challenge to a program like rent control on other than "facial" grounds, unless the
federal court is to become a version of Berkeley's Rent Stabilization Board, with power to pass on the
reasonableness of rents charged by individual landlords.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 99-135.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
72. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 729.
Antitrust and State Action
Professor Wiley regards the compromise as a bad one. He argues that,
by emphasizing clear articulation and supervision, the Midcal test actu-
ally polices state delegations of authority rather than capture. But delega-
tion, he says, is a poor proxy for capture, since special interests can cap-
ture state legislatures as well as regulatory bodies. According to Professor
Wiley, it is the Court's mistaken decision to police delegation, when what
it really wanted to do was police capture, that has led to the inconsistency
between the Court's underlying motivations and the cases' actual results.73
Judge Easterbrook makes a similar point. He contends that the Court
has chosen to require active supervision because it believes that to be the
best method of limiting the gains of special interests. This approach is
short-sighted, he argues, because while the supervision requirement can-
not effectively prevent capture, it may well force states to adopt the form
of regulation least favorable to allocative efficiency. And this he regards as
particularly ironic, in light of what he believes is the post-Parker Court's
assumption that state regulatory laws represent anticompetitive dispensa-
tions to politically powerful groups. 7 4
There is, however, a different explanation for why the cases do not
accord with the capture theory, namely, that concern over regulatory cap-
ture is not what has motivated the Court. An active supervision require-
ment is an ironic expression of capture concerns because the Court has not
been motivated by such concerns, and delegation is a poor proxy for cap-
ture because the Court never intended it to play such a role. Instead, the
restriction on delegation was intended to reconcile the Court's respect for
the political process in the states with its respect for the national political
process. When viewed in this light the Midcal test serves its purposes
tolerably well, and the case law can be explained without recourse to the
revisionists' somewhat Procrustean methods.
B. State Action Immunity as Respect for the Political Process
1. The State Action Cases
Parker v. Brown was much less a case about judicial faith in economic
regulation than it was a case about judicial respect for the political pro-
cess. Parker was indeed a child of its times, but the most salient element
of that historical context was the Court's recent rejection 7 of the Lochner-
era doctrine of substantive due process, under which federal courts struck
down economic regulations they viewed as unreasonably interfering with
73. See id. at 731-33, 739.
74. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism, supra note 3, at 27-32.
75. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
The Yale Law Journal
the liberty of contract."8 Having only just determined not to use the Con-
stitution in that manner, the Court was not about to resurrect Lochner in
the garb of the Sherman Act.7"
It is this theme, rather than a concern for policing capture, that is
sounded in a number of subsequent state action opinions.' It is a theme
also reflected in the Court's repeated declaration that the anticompetitive
effect of a statute cannot be sufficient for its invalidation, else "the States'
power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed." 79
And it is a concern whose validity has been repeatedly brought home to
the Court by the tendency of plaintiffs, even in the post-Lochner era, to
couple antitrust attacks on state regulation with appeals to the due process
clause. 80 When the Court finds state action immunity in the same cases in
which it rejects substantive due process attacks,"' it cannot help but recog-
nize that the ghost of Lochner lurks behind both doors.
In a federal scheme of government, however, respect for the political
process alone is insufficient to decide those cases in which the political
processes at the state and national levels give conflicting signals. The
Parker Court understood this dilemma well. On the one hand, the Court
did not believe Congress had intended the Sherman Act to "nullify" a
state's regulation of its own economy; 2 on the other hand, it was equally
sure that Congress would not have permitted a state to nullify the Sher-
man Act itself by "authorizing" private parties "to violate" the Act "or by
declaring that their action is lawful."8"
The post-Parker cases constitute the Court's effort to thread this
76. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 441-62 (11th ed. 1985); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
434-42 (1978).
77. See Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 328, 331-34 (1975). Indeed, the California statute at issue in Parker was based on a
federal statute, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, that the Court had at one time declared
largely unconstitutional, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), but had recently upheld in reen-
acted form as the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, United States v. Rock Royal Coop.,
307 U.S. 533 (1939). See Wiley, supra note 3, at 719 n.18.
78. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 664 (1982) (rejecting parallel due process
challenge); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978) (same); Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1978) (same); see also Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67-68 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning of dangers of
reviving Lochner-type scrutiny through Sherman Act); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 421 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (holding in Parker understandable as reac-
tion against substantive due process); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 640 (1976) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting) (accusing Court of applying substantive due process under Sherman Act guise).
79. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 133; see Rice, 458 U.S. at 659; New Motor Vehicle Bd., 439 U.S. at
110-11.
80. See Rice, 458 U.S. at 664; New Motor Vehicle Bd., 439 U.S. at 106-07; Exxon, 437 U.S. at
124; Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45-47 (1966).
81. See cases cited supra note 80.
82. 317 U.S. at 351.
83. Id.
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needle-an effort to protect true state regulation, even if anticompetitive,
but to bar mere state "authorization" of private anticompetitive conduct.
Judged by this standard, the clear articulation/active supervision test is
not a dismal compromise between faith in regulation and fear of capture.
Instead, it is a relatively sensible compromise between the judiciary's obli-
gation to respect the results of the democratic process at the state level and
its obligation to respect that same process at the national level.
As part of that compromise, the "clear articulation" requirement en-
sures that antitrust law will not be set aside unless the state does in fact
intend to displace competition, i.e., the challenged scheme does not simply
represent unsanctioned private conduct." The supervision requirement
ensures that even where there is state authorization, such authorization
constitutes more than mere permission to violate the Sherman Act. A state
may displace the Act, but in doing so it must replace it with a scheme of
state regulation.8 5
Professor Wiley is correct, then, in describing the articulation/supervi-
sion test as an effort to control delegation."' The test seeks to immunize
action taken by the state qua state, but to bar delegation to private parties
of the power to restrain competition.8 7 As the Court made clear in Mid-
cal, its purpose is to prevent a state from thwarting the national policy in
favor of competition by casting "a gauzy cloak of state involvement over
what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."88
84. In Goldfarb, for example, the Court rejected the Virginia Bar's assertion of state authoriza-
tion for its minimum fee schedules, where examination revealed that the state supreme court had
actually "directed lawyers not 'to be controlled' by fee schedules." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 789 (1975) (citation omitted); see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985) (explaining Goldfarb). In Bates, however, the Court upheld a prohibi-
tion on lawyer advertising when it determined that the restraint was ordered by the state court itself.
See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1977); see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 568,
570-73 (1984) (explaining Bates). See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 214;
Areeda, supra note 54, at 437.
85. Hence, the Court rejected the state action defense in Midcal because the state had essentially
authorized private resale price maintenance without making any effort to replace antitrust prohibi-
tions with state supervision. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 103, 105-06 (1980); see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U. 34, 39-40
(1985) (explaining Midcal). It upheld the defense in Parker itself, however, where California officials
supervised the raisin marketing program established by state-authorized grower committees. See
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346-47, 352 (1943); see also Midcal, 445 U.S. at 104 (explaining
Parker). See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, I 213; Areeda, supra note 54, at
436-37.
86. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 733, 739.
87. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985); Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38, 46-47 (1985); Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 70 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
88. 445 U.S. at 106.
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2. The Municipal Action Cases
The problem with the Court's opinions in its first two municipal action
cases, Lafayette and Boulder, was that they sought to police all delega-
tions of state legislative power, not simply delegations to private parties.
Based on a technical,89 and debatable,90 conception of federalism, the
Court declined to treat cities as equivalent to states for purposes of the
Sherman Act. Consequently, the Court effectively treated federal antitrust
law as a species of state administrative law, determining which intrastate
allocations of political power should be given effect and which should
not.9 The flaw in this approach is that the Sherman Act contains no
warrant for policing cities' pursuit of their parochial-but still pub-
lic-interests; that is a matter for state law and state courts. On this point,
both Professor Wiley and Judge Easterbrook concur. 2
The two most recent municipal action cases reflect the Court's recogni-
tion of-although not yet a willingness to renounce-the problem inher-
ent in Boulder, and a new determination to limit itself to policing delega-
tions to private parties. In Hallie, the Court declared that "the Sherman
Act was intended to prohibit private restraints on trade";9" that unlike a
private party, "[w]e may presume . . . [a] municipality acts in the public
interest";94 and that "[w]here the actor is a municipality, there is little or
no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing agreement."9 Ac-
cordingly, it held state supervision unnecessary for municipal immunity."
89. The Boulder opinion was based on the "federalism principle that we are a Nation of States, a
principle that makes no accommodation for sovereign subdivisions of States." Community Communi-
cations Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50 (1982) (emphasis in original); see also City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("Cities are not
themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create them.").
90. As the dissenters in Boulder and Lafayette noted, see Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69-70 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 430 & n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting), the Court has treated cities
as equivalent to states in numerous other contexts in which federalism concerns are no less pressing.
See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Tenth Amendment), overruled on
other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (supremacy clause); Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968) (Fourteenth Amendment). But see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.12
(1974) (political subdivisions not protected by Eleventh Amendment). Indeed, the Parker Court itself
noted that that case involved "no question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a
private agreement." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (emphasis added).
91. See Areeda, supra note 54, at 453-55; see also Boulder, 455 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Court's use of Sherman Act to regulate relation between states and their politi-
cal subdivisions); Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 434-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's interfer-
ence with state's ability to delegate power to its municipalities).
92. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism, supra note 3, at 36-38; Wiley, supra note 3, at
735, 766.
93. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985) (emphasis in original) (citing
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351).
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. The Court also cited Justice Stewart's dissent in Lafayette, warning that imposing too
strict a "clear articulation" requirement would have "detrimental side effects upon municipalities'
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Similarly, in Fisher, the Court announced it would treat cities and states
alike for purposes of its threshold preemption analysis,97 without sug-
gesting any reason to treat cities differently for "preemption" than for
"immunity"-a point the author of Boulder and Lafayette understandably
viewed as effectively discarding those cases."
The Court's unwillingness to overrule Boulder, however, led to its ef-
fort in Fisher to achieve the same result by focusing on the absence of
cagreement" in Berkeley's rent control ordinance. That focus, however,
confuses the question of whether a substantive violation of the antitrust
laws has occurred with the question of whether, notwithstanding any vio-
lation, the restraint at issue constitutes state action.
Where a restraint is challenged as violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the presence of an agreement is, of course, essential to liability. The
Fisher Court correctly concluded that the rent control ordinance involved
no such agreement among landlords; indeed, the landlords had brought
the suit challenging the ordinance and were opposed to its provisions.100
And the Court was equally correct in finding no agreement between the
city and the landlords (or the tenants, for that matter). As the Court ex-
plained, "[t]he ordinary relationship between the government and those
who must obey its regulatory commands whether they wish to or not is
not enough to establish a conspiracy."' ' Indeed, unless a city itself partic-
ipates in a private conspiracy °'-a circumstance that is perhaps best lim-
ited to cases of outright bribery or corruption 1 3-the existence of a true
agreement involving a city will almost always be lacking in cases of mu-
nicipal regulation. To hold otherwise would be to deem the very social
contract that binds citizens together a "conspiracy" in restraint of trade.10
But the existence of a substantive violation of the Sherman Act was not
the issue in Fisher. The plaintiff landlords were not seeking to hold any-
one liable under the Act; they would have been the only possible co-
local autonomy and authority to govern themselves." 471 U.S. at 44 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
434-35).
97. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045, 1048 (1986); supra text accompanying notes
64-71.
98. See 106 S. Ct. at 1053, 1056 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes
127-35 (noting similarity between preemption and immunity analysis).
99. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy" to estab-
lish a violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984).
100. See 106 S. Ct. at 1047, 1049-50.
101. Id. at 1050.
102. See id. at 1051; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943) ("[W]e have no question of
the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination .... ").
103. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW S 203.3c (Supp. 1982); Areeda, supra note 54, at 451-52.
104. See Brief for Appellees at 19, Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986) (No. 84-
1538).
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conspirators. 0 5 To the contrary, they sought not treble damages, the clas-
sic remedy for a Sherman Act violation, but rather an injunction against
the rent control ordinance's enforcement, 6 the classic remedy in preemp-
tion cases.10 7 The plaintiffs' contention was that the ordinance, on its face,
conflicted with section 1 of the Sherman Act and was therefore invalid
under, and preempted by, the Constitution's supremacy clause.108
The test for preemption, 09 Justice Marshall said, was whether the or-
dinance was "irreconcilably" in conflict with the antitrust laws.?10 Such
an irreconcilable conflict could not result "'simply because the state
scheme may have an anticompetitive effect.' "1 As the Court explained
in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, "if an adverse effect on compe-
tition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the
States' power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively de-
stroyed."112 Justice Marshall suggested that an irreconcilable conflict
could result if city officials corruptly participated in a conspiracy with
landlords 13 (which could also constitute a substantive violation by the
city), or if the ordinance were nothing more than a "gauzy cloak" for a
private price-fixing conspiracy among the landlords114 (which would pre-
empt the ordinance but should not render the city itself liable as a violator
of the Sherman Act' 1 5).
But the Court had never before held that cases involving such conspira-
cies were the only ones in which preemption could result. Indeed, such a
105. The landlords did not suggest that the tenants were involved in any alleged conspiracy. See
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 667 & n.17, 693 P.2d 261, 280 & n.17, 209 Cal. Rptr.
682, 701 & n.17 (1984) (noting plaintiffs' assertion that ordinance was facially invalid because it
created vertical combinations between rent board and individual landlords and horizontal combination
among landlords), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
106. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 653, 693 P.2d at 270, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
107. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1977); Community Communi-
cations Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 64-65 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing
effect of preemption as simply rendering statute unenforceable).
108. See Fisher, 37 Cal. 3d at 656-57, 660, 693 P.2d at 272-73, 275, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 693-94,
696.
109. As noted below, the test for "preemption" and that for state action "immunity" ultimately
converge. See infra text accompanying notes 127-35.
110. Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659
(1982)). In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984), the Court held that state law
is preempted "to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to
comply with both" or "where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."
111. 106 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Rice, 458 U.S. at 659).
112. 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
113. See 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
114. Id.
115. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 64-65, 68 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Once the ordinance is
preempted, private parties could no longer rely on it for a municipal action defense. Whether liability
could be assessed for the period prior to the ordinance's preemption, however, is a question the Court
has not yet decided. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 600 (1976) (plurality opinion);
id. at 614 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 1 217b.
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result could hardly be justified since section 2 of the Sherman Act, unlike
section 1, proscribes wholly unilateral conduct. 16 Moreover, even as to
challenges involving section 1, the Court had never before made the pres-
ence of an "agreement" a prerequisite to preemption."'
In Midcal, for example, a California statute prohibited wholesalers
from selling a producer's wine at a price other than that set in a schedule
filed by the producer." ' There was no question of any agreement among
wholesalers, nor was there any agreement between the producer and the
wholesaler. Indeed, the suit was brought by a wholesaler who had refused
to abide by the scheduled prices." 9 As the Court held with respect to the
landlord-plaintiffs in Fisher, a restraint complied with-if at all-under
threat of state coercion does not constitute a "meeting of the minds."'"2
Nonetheless, the Midcal Court invalidated the statute, finding that it
amounted to unsupervised resale price maintenance. 121
To much the same effect is Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.122 At issue in Schwegmann was a Louisiana state law requiring a
retailer who had not signed a resale price maintenance agreement to fol-
low the prices set in contracts between his distributor and other retailers
who had signed. Since at the time the Miller-Tydings Act'23 exempted the
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (declaring monopolization and attempts to monopolize unlawful); 3
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 1 820. Justice Marshall anticipated this point by sug-
gesting that § 2 attacks, unlike per se attacks under § 1, were not truly preemptive because "the
inquiry demanded . . . goes beyond the scope of [a] facial challenge." 106 S. Ct. at 1051 n.2; cf.
supra note 69 (suggesting Court has limited "preemption" analysis to facial challenges). Even if that
were true in a case like Fisher, it certainly is not always true. No detailed rule of reason analysis
would be required, for example, to disclose the anticompetitive effects of an ordinance establishing a
municipally-owned monopoly in a previously competitive market. Nor would there be much to distin-
guish a facial challenge to such an ordinance from one seeking to overturn the ordinance "as applied."
Accordingly, if such an ordinance is to survive antitrust challenge, it must do so because it satisfies the
Midcal criteria-not because it does not involve "agreement." See infra text accompanying notes
127-35.
117. Boulder itself involved a plaintiff's effort, using § 1 of the Sherman Act, to enjoin an ordi-
nance that temporarily prohibited the expansion of its cable business into new areas of the city. See
455 U.S. at 46-47; see also id. at 62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing issue as "on[e] of pre-
emption rather than exemption"). The district court had found insufficient evidence to establish a
conspiracy between the city and the plaintiff's competitor, see id. at 47 n.9, the only agreement even
hypothetically conceivable in the case. Nonetheless, the Supreme court found the city's ordinance to lie
outside the state action defense because it was not undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy. See id. at 54-56.
118. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99-100
(1980); see Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (describing challenge to Midcal
statute as one involving preemption).
119. 445 U.S. at 100.
120. See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1050 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
810 (1946)).
121. 445 U.S. at 103, 105.
122. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
123. District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 673, 693, repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. The Act was an amendment to § 1 of
the Sherman Act, and provided that "nothing herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agree-
ments prescribing minimum prices for the resale [of specified commodities] when contracts or agree-
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signed agreements from Sherman Act challenge, the only question in the
case was the validity of the statutory provision affecting those who had not
agreed. 124 Despite the absence-by definition-of any challengeable
agreement, the Court held the statute to violate "the spirit of the proviso
which forbids 'horizontal' price fixing," and refused to permit its enforce-
ment against non-signers.
125
With a minor adjustment, Fisher itself can be made to look like AMidcal
and Schwegmann. In Fisher, the Court distinguished Berkeley's ordi-
nance, which it declined to strike, from a cartel among landlords, which it
would have struck, by arguing that only the latter involved an agree-
ment. 2" But now suppose that Berkeley had simply permitted a single
landlord-or a single tenant-to choose a price unilaterally, which the
city then required all others to pay. The scheme would plainly approxi-
mate the cartel result; indeed it would be more anticompetitive because it
would avoid the risk of price cheating inherent in a cartel. Yet, this time
the Court would not have the luxury of distinguishing the scheme from
that in Fisher by noting the presence of an agreement. Nonetheless, Mid-
cal and Schwegmann would still compel preemption.
What makes Midcal, Schwegmann, and the modified Fisher hypotheti-
cal irreconcilable with the Sherman Act is not the presence of agreement.
Rather, it is the state or local government's effort to delegate to private
parties the power to restrain competition, such private restraints being the
particular evil Congress intended the Sherman Act to prevent. 27 But this,
of course, is precisely the issue at the heart of the state action immunity
cases.' 8 Indeed, as noted above, it is the function of the two-pronged Mid-
cal test to determine whether just such a delegation has occurred.' 29
The statutes in Schwegmann and Midcal failed that test because in
those cases the states did not supervise private restraints; the prices the
states enforced were chosen by the producers or distributors alone.' 30 On
the other hand, what saved rent control in Fisher was not the absence of
abstract agreement, but rather the fact that the ordinance "place[d] com-
plete control over maximum rent levels exclusively in the hands of the
ments of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions [under local law]." 50 Stat.
673, 693. The Louisiana statute included both signer provisions covered by the Miller-Tydings Act,
and the non-signer provisions at issue in Schwegmann. See 341 U.S. at 386-87.
124. See 341 U.S. at 387-88, 395.
125. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
126. See Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1049.
127. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985); cases cited supra notes
87-88; see also Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943) ("[T]he Sherman Act . . . must be taken
to be a prohibition of individual and not state action.").
128. See supra text accompanying notes 75-88.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
130. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105; Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 386-87; 1 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 15, 1 209, 213b.
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[city's] Rent Stabilization Board.' 31 Moreover, the fact that the ordinance
was enacted pursuant to Berkeley's home rule powers-and hence without
the specific state authorization that Boulder had required-was largely
ignored. In short, whether the Court describes the state action doctrine as
a question of exemption,'32 immunity, 3 3 or preemption' 34-and whether
the case involves a state or a municipality-it is the two-pronged Midcal
test that now effectively determines whether the regulation at issue is sub-
ject to Sherman Act attack.
There are signs that the Fisher Court understood the way in which its
preemption analysis collapses into the Midcal test. Justice Marshall sug-
gested, for example, that there may be certain "hybrid" restraints that,
although imposed by government, could not be called wholly "unilat-
eral.' 13 5 He listed Midcal and Schwegmann as illustrations, and implied
that municipal ordinances using similar restraints would be preempted.
As this Section has shown, however, the problem in those cases was not
the presence of a "hybrid" agreement, but rather the state's failure to
supervise the private restraints it had authorized. The Court could thus
make the municipal action cases far more coherent by simply making
Midcal directly applicable to cities-expressly overruling Boul-
der-rather than continuing its scholastic debate over the meaning of the
word "agreement."
3. Summary
Both the state and municipal action cases reflect the Court's determina-
tion to prevent states from using Parker immunity to cede to private par-
ties the power to restrain the market. That determination does represent a
compromise, but not-as the revisionists suggest-a compromise between
faith in regulation and suspicion of regulatory capture. Rather, it repre-
sents an effort to reconcile state and federal interests, in the context of an
underlying respect for the results of the political process at both levels. It
is this effort that explains why the Court never adopted a wholly hands-
131. See 106 S. Ct. at 1051. Similarly, what saved state regulation in prior cases was the presence
of state authorization and supervision, rather than the absence of agreement. See, e.g., New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109-10 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362
(1977).
132. See New Motor Vehicle Bd., 439 U.S. at 109; City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393 n.8 (1978); see also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975)
("this so-called state-action exemption").
133. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 65-66 (1985); Hoo-
ver v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 560 (1984); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103; 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 15, 1 211.
134. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 662 n.9 (1982); Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Handler, Anti-
trust-1978, 78 CoI.um. L. REv. 1363, 1378-82 (1978).
135. 106 S. Ct. at 1050.
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on or wholly hands-off approach to state regulation, but instead struggled
with a series of different criteria for measuring the depth of state involve-
ment, finally coming to rest at the articulation/supervision test. True state
action, whether undertaken by the state or its municipality, is to be pro-
tected out of respect for the political process at the state or municipal
level; effectively private action is to be policed out of respect for Congress'
mandate in the Sherman Act.
II. THE DANGERS OF AN EFFICIENCY/CAPTURE TEST
In addition to describing where they think the state action doctrine has
been, many revisionists have proposals for where it ought to go. Not only
has concern over the inefficient results of regulatory capture motivated the
Court in the past, they argue, but it should continue to do so in the fu-
ture-only more expressly.
As Professor Wiley has set forth the most detailed proposal for a revi-
sion of the state action doctrine, his suggestion will be the principal focus
here. Wiley proposes a new, essentially two-pronged test to replace the
one used in Midcal. Under this test, the Sherman Act would preempt
state or local regulation that: (1) restrains market rivalry without re-
sponding directly to a substantial market inefficiency, and (2) originates
from the decisive political efforts of producers who stand to profit from the
restraint.1"6 Other writers have advanced tests incorporating one or more
of these or similar factors."' The following two Sections consider the dan-
gers independently posed by each of Professor Wiley's two prongs al-
though, as noted below, he would require satisfaction of both prongs to
trigger preemption.
A. The Economic Efficiency Criterion
Were a state action test simply to condemn any statute that restrained
competition, most if not all state and local market regulation would ex-
pire. 3 " Recognizing this, 39 Professor Wiley has included a market defect
proviso in the first prong of his proposed test: A state may escape preemp-
tion by showing that the challenged regulation directly addresses a sub-
stantial market inefficiency, a showing that the courts should examine
136. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 743. As described in his article, Professor Wiley's test is actually
four-pronged. The first prong set forth in the text above condenses two elements Wiley lists sepa-
rately. Professor Wiley's fourth prong would protect any regulation covered by an independent federal
antitrust exemption. Since in theory that point is unobjectionable, it is not considered in this Article.
137. See infra notes 141, 160.
138. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978) ("[Ihf an adverse effect on
competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage
in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed.").
139. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 745.
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with an "intermediate level" of scrutiny. 40 Professor Cirace, Messrs.
Werden and Balmer, and several other authors have proposed related
tests.141
The parallels between this efficiency test and the test employed in
Lochner are sobering. 42 Exercising an intermediate level of scrutiny, a
revisionist antitrust court would consider the appropriateness of the state
purpose involved (Does it address a serious market defect?);14 determine
whether the regulation is an effective means of achieving that purpose
(Are there less restrictive alternatives?);"4 and then judge the regulation's
overall reasonableness in that light (Do the costs outweigh the bene-
fits?).1 45 But these are virtually the identical inquiries made by the Su-
preme Court during the Lochner era,146 and it was the exercise of just
such discretionary power by federal judges that the post-Lochner cases
sought to preclude. As the Court proclaimed in Ferguson v. Skrupa, the'
140. See id. at 743, 748, 762-64.
141. See Cirace, supra note 3, at 486 (proposing preemption unless, inter alia, "substantial mar-
ket inadequacies are inherent . . . [and] the competitive displacement is no greater than the scope of
the market problems at which it is aimed"); Werden & Balmer, supra note 3, at 61 (barring preemp-
tion where state's purpose was "to correct a failure of the market" and where state did not go "further
than was necessary to achieve" its purpose); see also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579,
610-13 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (proposing "rule of reason" test requiring that where end-
ing competition is state's objective, there must be evidence "that such competition is in some way
ineffective"); Donnem, supra note 3, at 967 (proposing exemption only where the state has a "legiti-
mate local reason for limiting competition" and "there is no less restrictive alternative"); Posner,
supra note 3, at 707-14 (proposing that economic regulation be protected only if it is "public utility"
regulation, but that health and safety regulation be protected if it satisfies "rule of reason").
Professor Slater's proposal involves more outright "balancing" than most of those cited in this foot-
note, requiring the state to "demonstrate that it had a valid reason behind its regulation and that the
interest furthered by the regulation was of greater significance than preserving competition." See
Slater, supra note 3, at 104; see also Kennedy, supra note 3, at 73 (also proposing balancing test). If
anything, Professor Slater's approach is even more Lochnerian than Professor Wiley's. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-48.
142. See Community Communieations Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Verkuil, supra note 77, at 334. Judge Easterbrook recognizes similar parallels and
would oust only those anticompetitive state regulations that impose overcharges on citizens of other
states. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and Federalism, supra note 3, at 24-25, 45-50. Professor Cirace
also recognizes the similarity; he, however, argues that a substantive due process standard should be
applied in state action eases. See Cirace, supra note 3, at 484.
143. Wiley, supra note 3, at 748, 764; see Cantor, 428 U.S. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Cirace, supra note 3, at 486, 515; Donnem, supra note 3, at 967; Posner, supra note 3, at 707;
Werden & Balmer, supra note 3, at 61; cf. Slater, supra note 3, at 104 (requiring state to have "a
valid reason" behind its regulation).
144. Wiley, supra note 3, at 763; see Cirace, supra note 3, at 486, 498, 515; Donnem, supra note
3, at 967; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 73; Posner, supra note 3, at 707, 714; Slater, supra note 3, at
105; Werden & Balmer, supra note 3, at 61.
145. Wiley, supra note 3, at 763-64; see Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 73; Posner, supra note 3, at 714; Slater, supra note 3, at 104; Werden &
Balmer, supra note 3, at 61-62.
146. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (holding that the state's "end itself must
be appropriate and legitimate," that the "act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end,"
and that there "is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker"); L. TRIE, supra note 76,
at 436-42.
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federal judiciary does not sit as a "'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation' " passed by elected officials.147
Moreover, it is not only its methodology that makes the efficiency test
dangerously like Lochner; its effects are likely to be comparable as well. If
antitrust concepts developed for private restraints are applied to state ac-
tion, regulations as disparate as zoning and occupational licensing, exclu-
sive franchises and rent control, minimum wages and minimum hours
could all be overturned. 4" This should hardly be surprising, as most such
regulations were not intended to correct market inefficiencies, but to serve
other social values. Whether the trade-offs such regulations represent are
intelligent ones is, of course, open to debate; but whether federal courts
should make that determination is a debate the Court thought it had
ended in the 1930's.
It is no coincidence that in many of the Supreme Court cases involving
antitrust attacks on state regulation, plaintiffs have also advanced "due
process" challenges that make virtually the identical substantive argu-
ments.149 Until now, the Court has been able to dispose of the due process
challenges by citing cases like Ferguson v. Skrupa,'50 while disposing of
the antitrust challenges by citing cases like Parker v. Brown.1 51 If the
efficiency test is adopted, however, the same regulations that survive con-
stitutional scrutiny are likely to fall under the antitrust knife.
Professor Wiley defends his proposal on two principal grounds. First,
he argues that placing judges in a policymaking role is not inconsistent
with Congress' intent in passing the Sherman Act. By using sweeping
language, yet providing little guidance in terms of legislative history, Con-
gress, he asserts, intended to grant courts common law power to make
substantive policy. 52
147. 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963) (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,
423 (1952)); see Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535-37
(1949); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67-68 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
148. See Boulder, 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 439 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Professor Wiley agrees that
the efficiency test, if applied alone and without his additional capture criterion discussed infra text
accompanying notes 158-92, "would logically lead courts to use the Sherman Act[]... to question
any state or local policy that affects resource allocation by altering the rewards to economic activities."
Wiley, supra note 3, at 765. He notes that such "traditional state and local laws" as "market prohibi-
tions on prostitution, marijuana, and baby-selling; restrictions on gun, firework, and drug sales; and
limitations such as rent, usury, and condominium conversion controls" could all become actionable. Id.
Another revisionist suggests an additional list of "possibly anticompetitive state laws," including "Sun-
day closing and other blue laws, . . . state taxation schemes which discriminate among competitors,
building and construction regulations which favor some competitors over others, zoning ordinances
* [and] occupational licensing." Donnem, supra note 3, at 951.
149. See cases cited supra note 80.
150. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
151. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
152. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 776-77.
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But divining a congressional intention to permit common law develop-
ment of the rules governing private restraints is one thing;153 extending
that to permit judicial overruling of the policy choices of state and local
governments is quite another. It is true that there is little in the Sherman
Act's legislative history that expressly addresses the state action question
one way or the other.'" A recognition of that congressional silence, how-
ever, simply shifts the operative question to who should bear the burden
of proof. And, in light of the drastic implications of applying antitrust
concepts to state action, the Parker Court's allocation seems about right:
"In a dual system of government in which . . . the states are sovereign,
. . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."55 In other words,
if Congress had intended the antitrust laws to be used to overturn hun-
dreds of statutes in virtually every state, one might expect some congress-
man to have at least mentioned the possibility.
Professor Wiley's second defense is more fundamental. His test is not
Lochner revisited, he argues,, because it is not a constitution he is ex-
pounding. While Lochner's interpretation of the due process clause could
not be overturned without a constitutional amendment (or a change in the
Court's views or membership), Congress can overturn a misinterpretation
of the Sherman Act-if that is what the efficiency test turns out to
be-any time it likes. 56
It is true, of course, that the Sherman Act is not a constitution, repeated
references to "charter[s] of freedom" and "Magna Carta[s]" notwithstand-
ing. 1 7 Its language does have constitutional breadth, however, and if in-
terpreted as the revisionists would like, it would have a preemptive power
exceeding even that of the genuine document. Moreover, although it is
153. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438-39 & n.14 (1978);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 144, at 48-50 (3d ed. 1981). But see Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S.
630, 642-47 (1981) (Congress granted courts far less discretion to fashion Sherman Act remedies than
to define violations).
154. See Slater, supra note 3, at 83. But see Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 56 n.19 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1890) for
proposition that "[t]here are ... some statements in the legislative history that affirmatively express a
desire not 'to invade the legislative authority of the several States.' "); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 632-37 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that Sherman Act Congress under-
stood its commerce clause power as being too narrow to preempt state regulation); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("The sponsor of the bill . . . declared that it prevented only 'business
combinations.' ").
155. 317 U.S. at 351; see Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 89 HARV. L. REv. 715, 721 (1976).
156. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 779.
157. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise."); Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.").
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also true that Sherman Act interpretations are subject to congressional re-
versal, that escape hatch is available in all questions of statutory interpre-
tation. Its existence does not relieve courts of the obligation to decide the
matter in the first instance, thereby determining who will bear the burden
of legislative change. The adoption of an efficiency test would sanction
massive judicial intrusion into the policies of public officials and state leg-
islatures. That the proposed test is not immutable may distinguish it from
Lochner (though Lochner ultimately was not immutable either); it does
little, however, to reduce its sting.
B. The Capture Criterion
The above debate about the appropriateness of an efficiency criterion
notwithstanding, Professor Wiley recognizes that a preemption test com-
posed of that criterion alone would jeopardize a breathtaking array of
state and local policies.1 58 To limit the imperial breadth of the test, he
therefore adds a second prong: State regulation should be preempted only
if it is both inefficient and a result of the decisive political efforts of the
producers who stand to profit from it, i.e., if it is the product of "producer
capture." A plaintiff may establish this criterion by adducing direct evi-
dence of decisive producer lobbying, or by showing indirectly that the fa-
cial characteristics of the regulation suggest capture and requiring the
state to rebut the inference.1 59 Other revisionists have made comparable
suggestions.'60 This Section considers the constitutional problems raised
both by the general concept of a capture test and by Professor Wiley's
further proposal to limit preemption to instances of "producer"-as op-
posed to "consumer"-capture.
1. Capture
The problem with the capture criterion is that it imposes a penalty on
rights that are at the core of the First Amendment: the right to debate
158. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 765; supra note 148.
159. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 743.
160. See Cirace, supra note 3, at 485, 486, 498, 514, 515 (proposing that private parties be
permitted to benefit from competitive displacements only if chosen in manner consistent with due
process and ethical conduct); Slater, supra note 3, at 105 (favoring balancing test that would "prevent
the enforcement of unnecessarily protective legislation which usually benefits only a special interest
group rather than the public as a whole"); Werden & Balmer, supra note 3, at 61 (proposing that
state statutes be preempted where animated by "illegitimate, anticompetitive purpose[s]"); cf Easter-
brook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 15-19, 54 (arguing that courts should narrowly construe statutes
passed to benefit special interests, and suggesting that one way to determine whether a statute is
special-interest legislation is to ask, "Who lobbied for the legislation?"); id. at 18-19
("[A]nticompetitive bargains embedded in state legislation will become targets for challenge under the
antitrust laws; the deference due toward a statute that corrects 'market failures' is not due toward a
statute that creates them.").
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public issues, to petition the government, and to seek to influence the out-
come of the political process. 16' Professor Wiley's reply is that the penalty
imposed is in fact quite light. Defendants are not penalized for lobbying
per se; they are penalized only if their proposal is enacted, and then the
only penalty is invalidation."8 2 Yet such a scheme makes the lobbyists'
protected political activity the only thing that renders the regulation ille-
gal; but for their involvement, the program they seek would pass judicial
inspection. As such, the capture test is likely to chill protected activity far
more than would a monetary penalty imposed directly on lobbying itself,
for it applies what for the lobbyist must be the ultimate sanction.' 3 After
all, why lobby for a bill which, once it passes the legislature, must fail in
the courts because of your lobbying?
Indeed, deterring interest group lobbying is the whole idea behind the
capture test. The hope is that by deterring such lobbying the Sherman
Act's efficiency interest will be advanced.'" Accordingly, the capture test
must rely on a more basic defense: Even if the test penalizes lobbying, it
only penalizes those who lobby for selfish, anticompetitive laws. Producers
remain free to lobby as much as they want to cure genuine market ineffi-
ciencies.' 6 ' But it is precisely this kind of effort to select the subjects about
which a person may speak, and the persons who may speak about a sub-
ject, that treads most heavily on First Amendment freedoms.' Making
the speaker's self-interest the selection criterion only increases the damage.
The leading case supporting this critique of the capture criterion is
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, in
which the Court held that a violation of the Sherman Act could not be
161. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
Professor Wiley correctly points out that one can read Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 429 U.S. 579,
594 (1976), which denied state action immunity to an electric utility's free lightbulb program despite
agency approval, as counting against immunity the utility's request for such approval. See Wiley,
supra note 3, at 780 & n.308. But Cantor was inconsistent with both Parker and Noerr in that
regard, see Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1943) (noting raisin producers' role in petition-
ing for regulatory program); infra note 167 (quoting Noerr), and the Court effectively abandoned
that element of Cantor in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 360-63 (1977). See 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 15, 215b; Handler, supra note 134, at 1385.
162. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 780-81. Professor Wiley also argues that the restriction on
lobbying is narrow. Only lobbying of state and local legislatures is limited; producers remain free to
lobby Congress to achieve their interests. Id. The availability of such a federal override, however, has
never been held to displace the constitutional right to petition one's state legislature. See, e.g., Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 167-70).
163. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (holding unconstitutional state election law
that penalized candidate's protected political activity by invalidating his election); infra note 167
(quoting Noerr).
164. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 772-73.
165. Id. at 780.
166. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978).
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predicated upon an attempt to influence the passage of legislation. 6 7 Re-
lying on both statutory interpretation and First Amendment considera-
tions,"6 8 the Court held that the legality of the defendant railroads' lobby-
ing campaign "was not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it
may have had."'" 9 As Justice Black explained:
The right of the people to inform their representatives in government
of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws
cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing
so. . . . A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify
people from taking a public position on matters in which they are
financially interested would . . . deprive the . . . people of their
right to petition in the very instances in which that right may be of
the most importance to them. 70
Subsequent cases have made much the same point by emphasizing that
the right to endeavor to influence public opinion includes the right to do
so out of self-interested, and even blatantly anticompetitive, motives.171 In-
167. 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961); see also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404
U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) (extending Noerr to efforts to influence administrative agencies); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965) (extending Noerr to efforts to influence
public officials).
In Noerr, the asserted violation was the act of lobbying itself rather than, as here, the legislative
result of such lobbying. As discussed above, however, invalidating the result inhibits the exercise of
First Amendment rights even more than does penalizing lobbying directly. See supra text accompany-
ing note 163; see also Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137 n.17 ("In Parker v. Brown . . . we rejected the conten-
tion that the program's validity under the Sherman Act was affected by the nature of the political
support necessary for its implementation-a contention not unlike that rejected here.") (emphasis
added).
168. See 365 U.S. at 137-40. Subsequent cases have emphasized Noerr's First Amendment ra-
tionale. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n.31; City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 399 & n.17 (1978); California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 509-11.
169. 365 U.S. at 140; see id. at 138 (dismissing as irrelevant allegation that defendants' "sole
purpose in seeking to influence the passage and enforcement of laws was to destroy ...
competitors").
170. 365 U.S. at 139. The Noerr doctrine does include a "sham" exception, but the exception
does not apply to the kind of genuine efforts to influence legislation that would be invalidated under
the capture test. See 365 U.S. at 144; Handler & De.Sevo, The Noerr Doctrine and Its Sham Excep-
tion, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 7-14, 54-55 (1984). In particular, the exception almost never applies to
situations in which lobbyists succeed in convincing the government to adopt their proposals, and
thereby demonstrate that their lobbying efforts were not merely a frivolous cover for activity not truly
intended to influence the government. See 1 P. ARFEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, % 203c. Yet
such lobbying successes are the only situations to which the capture test would apply. See supra text
accompanying note 162.
171. For example, in California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the
Court said:
We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels
and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of
view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-iz-vis their competitors.
Id. at 510-11; see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965) (ruling that
Sherman Act does not bar firms from seeking Labor Department regulations intended to drive smaller
rivals out of market); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 1 201; cf Consolidated Edison Co.
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deed, the Court has suggested that such interest group politics is at thie
heart of the Madisonian democratic tradition. "We have never insisted
that the franchise be exercised without taint of individual benefit," Justice
Brennan wrote in Brown v. Hartlage. "[O]ur tradition of political plural-
ism is partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue their
individual good through the political process, and that the summation of
these individual pursuits will further the collective welfare."1 2 There may
be much that is offensive about the reality of interest-group politics, and
much reason to hope that individuals will transcend their private interests
and seek instead the public good.1"' But the Court has never sanctioned
the restriction of political speech as a method of ensuring that they do so.
Given the penalty the capture test imposes on core First Amendment
interests, it must undergo the most exacting scrutiny if it is to pass consti-
tutional muster.'" That is a scrutiny the capture test cannot survive. To
begin with, although the governmental interest in preserving a competitive
market is surely a legitimate one, Noerr makes clear that it is not consti-
tutionally compelling. The message of Noerr is that Congress did not in-
tend, and that the Constitution will not permit, the federal interest in an
efficient marketplace to outweigh the right to participate in the political
process.175 And Noerr and Hartlage make equally clear that a
subordinate interest in deterring political appeals either from or to self-
interest is similarly uncompelling. 17 1
Nor is the capture test a narrowly tailored177 means for achieving the
interest in a competitive economy. First, the test is underinclusive. If a
market restraint is inefficient, why is it any more acceptable if it is the
product of ignorance rather than avarice?"'
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (holding that state may not bar utility from discussing
its support for nuclear power); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 (holding that state may not restrict bank's
campaign against tax referendum); supra note 169 (quoting Noerr).
172. 456 U.S. 45, 56 & n.7 (1982) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison)); see Noerr,
365 U.S. at 139.
173. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 56 n.7; THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 S'rAN. L. REv. 29 (1985); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 616 n.146 (1985).
174. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 53-54; Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540; Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 786.
175. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139, 143-44 (holding that Sherman Act does not reach lobbying
campaign even if campaign has both anticompetitive purpose and anticompetitive effect); see also
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-14 (1982) (interpreting Noerr).
176. See Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 56 ("The fact that some voters may find their self-interest re-
flected in a candidate's commitment does not place that commitment beyond the reach of the First
Amendment."); id. at 60 ("The State's fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not
provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech."); supra text accompanying notes
169-72 (quoting Noerr and Hartlage); see also supra note 171 (citing post-Noerr cases).
177. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 913-14 (1986); Har-
tlage, 456 U.S. at 54; Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786, 793, 794.
178. The answer Professor Wiley suggests is that where a legislature has been captured, "the
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But the capture test is overinclusive as well, largely because the concept
of "capture" is virtually undefinable. American legislation, at all govern-
mental levels, is filled with subsidies both blatant and concealed. From tax
deductions, to small business loans, to farm programs, to minority set-
asides, American legislation rewards political victors-both those in the
majority and those who create successful minority coalitions. The antitrust
laws themselves are hardly immune, as made manifest by special excep-
tions for the soft drink and insurance industries.17 1 In a society dominated
by interest-group politics, "capture" is often just a pejorative for political
success, and a committed interest group theorist is likely to have little
trouble viewing virtually any political result as the product of capture by
special interests.18 0 Given the difficulty both in determining individual
legislators' motives, and in assessing the significance of conflicting motives,
a capture test is likely to do little else than put enormous discretionary
power into the hands of an unelected judiciary. 81
2. Producer Capture
Professor Wiley recognizes the potentially indiscriminate nature of a
general capture test. To remedy that deficiency, he proposes one more
refinement: The courts should subject to antitrust scrutiny only those reg-
ulatory programs that have been captured by "producers"; regulations
arising from "consumer" capture should remain immune.1 82
The producer proviso, however, retains the constitutional flaws of the
state ...interest in self-governance is at its minimum," Wiley, supra note 3, at 769, and "state
political decisionmaking . . . deserv[es] less deference," id. at 764. This, however, is nothing more
than a restatement of the argument that the results of interest-group politics are unworthy of judicial
respect, a position the Court rejected in Noerr and Hartlage. See supra text accompanying notes
164-73.
179. See Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982); McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982) (insurance).
180. See S. BREYER, supra note 21, at 388 n.38; Tribe, supra note 173, at 616. In light of the
criminal penalties imposed by the antitrust laws, this definitional problem may also render the cap-
ture test void for vagueness. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1975).
181. There is a sense in which Professor Wiley's preemption test is more deferential to state
regulation than the Midcal test. For example, in situations where capture is absent, his test would
immunize state-sanctioned anticompetitive conduct even if the conduct were not supervised and clearly
articulated by the state. For the reasons noted in the text, however, this possibility is more theoretical
than real since regulations not characterizable as "captured" will be rare. Moreover, were such a
situation actually to occur, what the Wiley test would add in deference to state law would be more
than offset by the lack of deference it would accord the federal antitrust laws. For example, were a
state's citizens to pass a referendum permitting private price-fixing within the state, the Wiley test
would immunize such a law from antitrust attack as long as the voters appeared motivated not by
capture but by public interest (e.g., a genuine concern for the employees of a declining domestic
industry). Such a result, however, would effectively permit the state to nullify the Sherman Act within
its boundaries, a result difficult to square with notions of either congressional intent or federalism.
Indeed, it was to avoid precisely this difficulty that the Court turned to the compromise embodied in
Midcal. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
182. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 742-43, 768-69.
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general capture test. The governmental interests at issue are the same, and
remain uncompelling when compared to the restrictions on speech. The
test itself remains underinclusive. To parallel a point made earlier, if the
preemptive federal interest is allocative efficiency, why should an ineffi-
cient restraint stand simply because it has the benefit of "consumer" sup-
port? Although Professor Wiley regards Fisher v. City of Berkeley as a
case deserving immunity because it involves "consumer" capture, 8 3 few
economists would regard Berkeley's rent control ordinance as any less
inefficient because it was the product of tenant rather than landlord
pressures.18 4
Nor is the problem of definition, and so of overinclusiveness, materially
improved by adding a producer caveat. Do condominium conversion limi-
tations stem from renter-and therefore presumably "consumer"-a ctiv-
ism, or from lobbying by existing condominium owners who wish to limit
the supply of competing housing? Are regulations that tie the sale of new
cars to the purchase of airbags generated by "producer" pressure because
the insurance industry seeks them, or by consumer pressure because
Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety files an amicus brief?' 5 *
The irony, moreover, is that if the definitional problem could be solved,
the producer caveat would only exacerbate the capture test's First Amend-
ment problems. Classification of a political actor as a "producer" does not
reduce its First Amendment rights any more than would its classification
as a "corporation." As the Court held in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, and recently confirmed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, the identity of the speaker does not determine
whether its speech is either worthy or protected. 8 '
What such classification does do, however, is eliminate any pretense of
content neutrality, any claim that the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and so any warrant for reducing the
level of judicial scrutiny.18 7 To the contrary, preferring one speaker over
another is the central purpose of the producer capture test. The premise is
that special interest groups like producers wield undue influence because
183. Id. at 768.
184. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 73-74; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS
393-94 (12th ed. 1985).
185. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 207-08 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), vacated sub nor. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
186. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 907, 912 (1986); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 784 (1978); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137 n.17 (1961).
187. See Pacific Gas & Elec., 106 S. Ct. at 910-11; Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536-37,
540 n.9; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1976); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82
(1968).
The Yale Law Journal
of their greater ability to organize effectively for political action, and that,
accordingly, some steps to redress the balance are required.' Precisely
the same argument was made-and rejected-during the Court's consid-
eration of campaign expenditure limitations in Buckley v. Valeo:
It is argued . . . that the ancillary governmental interest in equaliz-
ing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the out-
come of elections serves to justify the limitation[s] . . . . But the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment . ... "'
The jurisprudence of the First Amendment reflects the fundamental
choice of a democracy to entrust to its citizens the responsibility for evalu-
ating public policy proposals.' 90 The people may choose to judge a pro-
gram by its friends, or they may overlook the taint of association alto-
gether; they may make wise choices, or they may make foolish ones.
Government, however, may not "fix" the result by restricting access to the
political process. It is the capture test's contemplation of just such a fix
that would render it unconstitutional even if it had Congress' express
blessing.'' Surely recognition of that fact rfiust stifle altogether any im-
pulse to imply such congressional intent from a statute that makes not the
slightest mention of it.'92
III. CONCLUSION
When litigants first began a spate of antitrust challenges to state regula-
tory programs, they presented the Court with a difficult dilemma: how to
respect the political process in the states without frustrating Congress'
purpose in enacting the Sherman Act. The resolution the Court reached,
sometimes precarious and often difficult to apply in individual cases, was
to focus on preventing the delegation to private p, rf ies of the power to
restrain competition. As long as a state retained effective control over the
regulation of its economy, the federal judiciary would honor that state's
188. See Wiley, supra note 3, at 724-25, 732; see also Cirace, supra note 3, at 483 n.19. See
generally Easterbrook, Foreword, supra note 2, at 15-16 (noting organizational advantages of pro-
ducers in seeking regulatory legislation).
189. 424 U.S at 48-49; see Pacific Gas & Elec., 106 S. Ct. at 914; Belloiti, 435 U.S. at 785,
789-92.
190. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92; Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263.
191. See cases cited supra note 189.
192. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137-38, 139
(1961).
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political decision to restrain market forces. When the state relinquished
control to private parties, however, the national political decision to bar
such private regulation would prevail.
At bottom, the flaw in the proposals to revise the state action doctrine is
that they take two useful analytic tools-microeconomic theory and cap-
ture theory-and apply them as normative concepts in an area in which
they are inapposite. There is much to be said-and debated"'9 -about the
merits of using economic efficiency criteria to derive antitrust rules for
private commercial conduct, or to assist policymakers in weighing the
costs and benefits of public programs. But it is a considerable leap to move
from such analytic applications to the notion that federal courts should use
the state action doctrine to preempt state regulations that impose ineffi-
cient restraints on market competition.
Similarly, there is much to be said-and debated'g-about the uses of
capture theory in understanding legislation and regulation, and even in
crafting administrative law doctrine. The theory may enhance the demo-
cratic process by informing legislators, regulators, and voters of the true
genesis of programs put forward in the guise of the public interest. In
administrative law, it may lead to closer judicial scrutiny of captured
agencies to ensure that they truly heed the legislative will.' 95
But using capture theory as a criterion for applying the state action
doctrine is another matter altogether. In that context, it is used neither as
a tool for understanding politics, nor as an instrument for ensuring agency
fidelity to the results of the political process. To the contrary, when used
as the touchstone for preempting state law, capture theory becomes a
weapon for overturning those results. And that is a role the courts should
not permit the antitrust laws to play.
193. Compare R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) with Pitofsky,
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).
194. See, e.g., M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 252-58 (1985)
(arguing that recent experience with deregulation suggests that American political system is capable of
overcoming interest-group pressures).
195. Cf Garland, supra note 36, at 553-61 (noting role of "hard look" review in ensuring agency
fidelity to legislative purpose); Sunstein, supra note 173, at 63, 65 (arguing that rigorous scrutiny
seeks to ensure that agencies implement public values and are not subverted by private groups).

